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Abstract: This paper looks at Nikola Pašić’s views of and contribution to the foreign policy of 
the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (SCS/Yugoslavia after1929) during the latest 
phase of his political career, a subject that has been neglected by historians. His activities 
in this field are divided into two periods – during the Paris Peace Conference where he was 
the head of the SCS Kingdom’s delegation and after 1921 when he became Prime Minis-
ter, who also served as his own Foreign Minister. During the peace conference, Pašić held 
strong views on all the major problems that faced his delegation, particularly the troubled 
delimitation with Italy in the Adriatic. In early 1920, he alone favoured the acceptance of 
the so-called Lloyd George-Clemenceau ultimatum, believing that the time was working 
against the SCS Kingdom. The Rapallo Treaty with Italy late that year proved him right. 
Upon taking the reins of government, Pašić was energetic in opposing the two restoration 
attempts of Karl Habsburg in Hungary and persistent in trying to obtain northern parts 
of the still unsettled Albania. In time, his hold on foreign policy was weakening, as King 
Alexander asserted his influence, especially through the agency of Momčilo Ninčić, For-
eign Minister after January 1922. Pašić was tougher that King and Ninčić in the negotia-
tions with Mussolini for the final settlement of the status of the Adriatic town of Fiume 
and the parallel conclusion of the 27 January 1924 friendship treaty (the Pact of Rome). 
Since domestic politics absorbed much of his time and energy, the old Prime Minister was 
later even less visible in foreign policy. He was forced to resign in April 1926 on account 
of his son’s corruption scandal shortly before the final break-down of relations with Italy.   
Keywords: Nikola Pašić, the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, Yugoslav state, foreign 
policy, peace conference, Pact of Rome
On 10 December 2016, it will have been exactly ninety years since Nikola Pašić (1845–1926), one of the most prominent statesmen in modern Ser-
bian history, passed away. His political career spanning over five decades was 
an integral part of the turbulent past of Serbia in the last twenty years of the 
nineteenth and the first quarter of the twentieth century. During this time, 
Pašić became the leader of Radicals, the largest political party in the country, 
and opposed the absolutist rule of the Obrenović dynasty struggling for par-
liamentary democracy; he emerged as Prime Minister following the coup d’état 
in 1903 and presided over what is often referred to as the golden age of Serbia 
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** It should be clarified that the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (SCS) was the of-
ficial name of the country until 1929 when it was changed to Yugoslavia. The latter name, as 
well as the term Yugoslavs (South Slavs) for its inhabitants, was often used even before 1929.
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under King Petar I Kardjordjević until the outbreak of war in 1914; he led his 
country through all the trials and tribulations of the Balkan Wars (1912–1913) 
and the Great War; and he maintained the key position in political life of the 
newly-formed Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (SCS) until his death 
in advanced age. Consequently, it is difficult to overstate the crucial role that 
the grand old man of Serbia played in all aspects of her internal and foreign 
policy, and, given the importance of Serbia in the build-up to and during the 
First World War, incommensurate with her size and strength, in international 
history of this troubled period.  
Naturally, Pašić has been the subject of much historiographical interest, 
although his scholarly biography is yet to be written.1 As a result of the emer-
gence of Yugoslavia on 1 December 1918, Pašić’s premiership during the First 
World War with special reference to the development of the Yugoslav question 
has received by far the most scholarly attention.2 As for studies of Pašić’s impact 
on the newly-formed SCS Kingdom, they are mostly concerned with internal 
politics, and particularly with the central issue of the tumultuous Serbo-Croat 
relations.3 In contrast, there is not a single work that focuses on the role of Pašić 
in the formulation and conduct of foreign policy – as opposed to the general 
surveys of that policy and a multitude of studies that address specific topics.4 
1 Most informative works on different aspects of Pašić’s political life are Nikola Pašić: život 
i delo, Zbornik radova sa naučnog skupa u Srpskoj akademiji nauka i umetnosti (Zaječar: 
Zadužbina “Nikola Pašić,” 1995); Vasa Kazimirović, Nikola Pašić i njegovo doba I-II (Bel-
grade: Nova Evropa, 1990); Djordje Stanković, Nikola Pašić: prilozi za biografiju (Belgrade: 
Plato, 2006); a masterly portrait of Pašić’s contemporary is provided in Slobodan Jovanović, 
Moji savremenici: o Nikoli Pašiću i Pismo iz Londona (Belgrade: Beoknjiga, 2014), 9–104. 
2 Charles Jelavich, “Nikola P. Pašić: Greater Serbia or Jugoslavia?” Journal of Central Euro-
pean Affairs 11 (1951), 133–152; Alex Dragnich, Serbia, Nikola Pašić and Yugoslavia (New 
Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1974); Dragoslav Janković, Jugoslovensko pitanje i Krf-
ska deklaracija 1917. godine (Belgrade: Savremena administracija, 1967); Dragoslav Janković, 
“ ‘Veliki’ i ‘mali’ ratni program Nikole Pašića (1914–1918)”, Anali Pravnog fakulteta u Beogradu 
2 (1973), 151–167; Djordje Stanković, Nikola Pašić i jugoslovensko pitanje 1-2 (Belgrade: 
BIGZ, 1985); Djordje Stanković, Srbija i stvaranje Jugoslavije (Belgrade: Službeni glasnik, 
2009); Djordje Radenković, Pašić i Jugoslavija (Belgrade: Službeni list SRJ, 1999); Drago-
van Šepić, Italija, saveznici i jugoslovensko pitanje, 1914–1918 (Zagreb: Školska knjiga, 1970); 
Vojislav Pavlović, De la Serbie vers la Yougoslavie: la France et la naissance de la Yougoslavie 
1878–1918 (Belgrade: Institut des études balcaniques, 2015). 
3 Alex Dragnich, The First Yugoslavia: Search for a Viable Political System (Stanford: Hoo-
ver Institution Press, 1983); Djordje Stanković, Nikola Pašić i Hrvati, 1918–1923 (Belgrade: 
BIGZ, 1995); Gordana Jović-Krivokapić, “Nikola Pašić 1918–1926: kraj jedne karijere”, Tok-
ovi istorije 1 (2011), 32–45. 
4 E.g. see Vuk Vinaver, “O spoljnopolitičkoj orijentaciji Jugoslavije, 1920–1925”, Zbornik za 
društvene nauke 44 (1966), 23–59; Bogdan Krizman, Vanjska politika jugoslavenske države 
1918–1941: diplomatsko-historijski pregled (Zagreb: Školska knjiga, 1975); Bojan Dimitrijević 
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Partial exception to this omission are the treatments of the proceedings of the 
SCS delegation at the Paris Peace Conference, of which Pašić was the head.5 
This apparent lacuna in the existing historiography is more understandable in 
the light of the fragmentary nature of primary sources – to a large extent, lost 
during the Second World War – that makes any attempt to determine Pašić’s 
personal influence on foreign policy a difficult venture. Nevertheless, such an 
attempt is both necessary and possible; that is exactly what this paper proposes 
to do.
In view of his role during the Great War, Pašić was surprisingly not the 
first Prime Minister of the SCS Kingdom in the Cabinet formed on 7 December 
1918. Although he was unanimously proposed for this position by all Serbian 
political parties and the representatives of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes from the 
former provinces of the Habsburg Empire, Prince Regent Alexander refused to 
confirm his premiership, giving a taste of his autocratic ambitions. Stojan Protić, 
a fellow Radical, formed a coalition Cabinet instead – Pašić was not even its 
member.6 To Pašić’s and his supporters’ chagrin, Ante Trumbić, the head of the 
Yugoslav Committee which had represented the Habsburg South Slavs during 
the war and clashed with Serbia’s Prime Minister, was appointed the Foreign 
Minister. The long-serving Serbian Minister in Paris, Milenko Vesnić, even of-
fered his resignation on account of his dissatisfaction with Trumbić’s inimical 
attitude towards Pašić and the entire Serbian government.7 On 22 December 
1918, Protić’s Cabinet appointed the delegation of the SCS Kingdom for the 
Peace Conference in Paris with Pašić at its head. Josip Smodlaka, a prominent 
Croat politician from Dalmatia, has claimed that he insisted on Pašić’s appoint-
ment, since the latter had not been allowed to be Prime Minister.8 Be that as it 
may, the grand old man of Serbia found himself in Paris in early January.  
and Stanislav Sretenović, “Spoljna politika Kraljevine SHS/Jugoslavije 1918–1941”, Istorija 
20. veka 26/2 (2008), 45–83. 
5 Ivo Lederer, Yugoslavia at the Paris Peace Conference: a Study in Frontiermaking (New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 1963); Andrej Mitrović, Jugoslavija na konferenciji mira 1919–1920 (Bel-
grade: Zavod za izdavanje udžbenika, 1969); Dejan Djokić, Nikola Pašić and Ante Trumbić: 
The Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (London: Haus Publishing, 2010). Djokić’s work 
is largely based on those of Lederer and Mitrović. 
6 Branislav Gligorijević, “Kralj Aleksandar Karadjordjević i Nikola Pašić”, in Nikola Pašić: 
život i delo (Belgrade: Zavod za udžbenike, 1997), 428, has ascribed the Regent’s ill will to-
wards Pašić to his bitterness on account of the latter’s handling of the Geneva declaration in 
November 1918 that enunciated the principles on which the Yugoslav state was going to be 
organised.   
7 Radoslav Vesnić, Dr Milenko Vesnić: gransenjer srpske diplomatije (Belgrade: Prometej, 
2008), 450–451. 
8 Dragan Stojković, ed., Zapisi Dra Josipa Smodlake (Zemun: Mostart, 2012), 124. 
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Pašić was the only head of a major delegation, with the exception of Ja-
pan, who was not at the same time Prime Minister or President of his coun-
try. He led a seven-member strong political delegation located in the Hôtel de 
Beau-Site on the Rue de Presbourg that was supported by around 100 exceed-
ingly able technical experts and secretaries. The all-important Political Section 
of the delegation was designed to reflect the composition of the SCS Kingdom 
founded on the premise that its population constituted a single – though three-
named – Yugoslav nation. It thus consisted of three Serbs, Pašić, Vesnić, and 
the former Serbian Minister in London Mateja Bošković; two Dalmatian Cro-
ats, Trumbić and Smodlaka; and two Slovenes, Ivan Žolger, university profes-
sor and formerly a holder of a ministerial post in the Habsburg service, and 
Otokar Ribarž, a prominent leader from Trieste and the Slovene littoral. Pašić, 
Trumbić, Žolger and Vesnić were plenipotentiaries who took part in the delib-
erations of the conference, while the other three men were “governmental del-
egates” equal with them in decision-making process within the delegation. In his 
capacity, Pašić had a direct and strictly confidential communication with Prime 
Minister in Belgrade, which allowed him to relay his personal views on different 
issues raised in Paris. These views were not necessarily those of the delegation 
as a whole, of which he made clear, but they were eagerly awaited in Belgrade. 
Pašić was by no means the only delegate who could contact the government 
at will: Foreign Minister Trumbić and the Parisian Minister Vesnić had their 
own channels of communication.9 Despite the fact that he had no ministerial 
responsibility, the sheer reputation of the 74-year-old Pašić secured a consid-
erable weight for his opinion both within the Yugoslav delegation and before 
the delegations of other powers.10 Nevertheless, the composition of Yugoslav 
delegation – Trumbić alone was a member of Cabinet – dictated that all the 
major decisions had to be made or approved of in Belgrade. Given the problems 
involved in the war-ravaged system of communications, this was a handicap for 
the delegation insofar it lacked authorisation to make decisions at crucial times; 
on the other hand, this could also provide a convenient excuse for avoiding or 
postponing difficult decisions. 
This analysis will not detail the work of the SCS delegation regarding 
the delimitation with the neighbouring countries, since that has been done else-
where.11 It will examine in broad lines the views and contribution of Pašić, and 
offer an assessment of his activities in Paris. But to scrutinise Pašić’s influence 
9 Mitrović, Jugoslavija na Konferenciji mira, 37–38.
10 Lederer, Yugoslavia at the Paris Peace Conference, 91–93. 
11 Apart from the cited monographs of Lederer and Mitrović, see also the latter’s Razgraničenje 
Jugoslavije sa Mađarskom i Rumunijom 1919–1920: prilog proučavanju jugoslovenske politike na 
Konferenciji mira u Parizu (Novi Sad: Forum, 1975); Bogdan Krizman, “Pitanje granica Vo-
jvodine na Pariškoj mirovnoj konferenciji 1919. godine”, Zbornik Matice srpske za društvene 
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and effectiveness, and indeed those of the entire SCS delegation, is to under-
stand that the Yugoslavs laboured under extremely difficult conditions. The 
fledgling state had territorial claims against six of its seven neighbours, allies 
and enemies alike – the old Serbian border with Greece was the only one out 
of dispute. Worst of all, the formally allied Italy proved to be from the outset 
an incubus of every single Yugoslav aspiration in terms of territorial settlement 
and political stabilisation.  The root of the trouble lay in Italy’s designs on the 
Slovene and Croat-populated provinces of Istria and Dalmatia which had been 
promised to her under the terms of the secret Treaty of London concluded on 
26 April 1915 in exchange for her entry into war on the side of the Entente 
Powers.12 The encroachment on Dalmatia and large part of Istria was a blatant 
abrogation of the nationality principle as there were a few Italians living in these 
lands. As signatories of the London Treaty, Britain and France were bound to 
support Italian claims on the Yugoslav territories – in what became known as 
the Adriatic question – whereas the American President, Woodrow Wilson, the 
champion of the right to national self-determination, sided with the Yugoslavs.  
But Italian enmity did not just stem from conflicting territorial claims; 
it was grounded in Rome’s opposition to the very existence of any large and 
nauke 24 (1959), 31–72; Desanka Todorović, “Pitanje jugoslovensko-bugarske granice na Mi-
rovnoj konferenciji u Parizu 1919–1920”, Istorija XX veka: zbornik radova IX (1968), 63–126. 
12 Milan Marjanović, Londonski ugovor iz godine 1915.: prilog povijesti borbe za Jadran 1914–
1917 (Zagreb: JAZU, 1960); Šepić, Italija, saveznici i jugoslovensko pitanje, 1–75. 
Nikola Pašić [Politka Online]
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independent Yugoslav state. For the Italians, such a state was in itself a hin-
drance to Italian ambitions in the Danube basin and the Balkans, and posed an 
even greater obstacle insofar it was viewed as an instrument of French policy 
for containing Italy.13 It was against this background that Italo-Yugoslav rela-
tions were developing during the peace conference and afterwards. One of the 
major difficulties that the Italians created for the SCS Kingdom was that it was 
not recognised by the Principal Allies and the Yugoslav delegation was officially 
regarded as that of pre-war Serbia. The international de facto recognition would 
not be granted before the SCS delegates attached their signature to the Ver-
sailles Peace Treaty with the defeated Germany.14 Apart from this, the Italian 
delegation had decisive advantages over the Yugoslavs in Paris: it was a member 
of the Allied Supreme Council, along with France, Britain, the USA and Japan, 
that made all the final decisions; in that capacity, it reserved for the Supreme 
Council the solution of territorial disputes with the SCS Kingdom – the lat-
ter country, of course, had no say in its deliberations; it exerted influence in the 
territorial committees that decided on border disputes between small powers 
to the detriment of Yugoslavs. In addition, Italian troops were in occupation of 
the large slices of Dalmatia and most of Albania which provided another means 
of putting pressure on the SCS Kingdom.15 To facilitate its goals, the Italian 
government sanctioned in December 1918 the execution of the plan drawn up 
by General Badoglio for the purpose of disrupting the Yugoslav union using 
all available subversive activities short of war.16 Constant Yugoslav anxieties in 
regard to Italian hostility were thus far from being exaggerated. 
On the evening of 18 January 1919, immediately after the official opening 
of the peace conference, an exceptionally important session of the delegation 
took place for the purpose of presenting a memorandum on Yugoslav territorial 
demands. Smodlaka argued that the Yugoslavs should absolutely adhere to the 
nationality principle and restrict their demands to those territories populated by 
their people. Pašić acknowledged the primacy of nationality principle, but made 
it clear that Italy’s demands at the expense of the SCS Kingdom as an allied 
country and their own revendications at the expense of the former enemies fell 
into two distinct categories. Furthermore, he claimed, “it is not possible to draw 
a political border along ethnographic line, as the nations are mixed, and as much 
foreign population we take as many of our own people will remain to others.” 
With General Pešić, head of the military mission, and Bošković strongly advo-
13 Vojislav Pavlović, “Le conflit franco-italien dans les Balkans 1915–1935. Le rôle de la You-
goslavie”, Balcanica XXXVI (2005), 163–201.   
14 Bogdan Krizman, “Pitanje međunarodnog priznanja jugoslavenske države”, Istorija XX 
veka: zbornik radova III (1962), 345–386.  
15 Mitrović, Jugoslavija na Konferenciji mira, 103–108. 
16 Lederer, Yugoslavia at the Paris Peace Conference, 71–75. 
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cating maximalist demands based on strategic needs and for bargaining pur-
poses, and Trumbić and Smodlaka – as well as Ribarž but not his fellow Slovene 
Žolger – standing for ethnic criterion, the cleavage in the delegation assumed 
an air of Serbo-Croat conflict of interest. General Pešić had no doubt that this 
was the case when he recorded, “Clearly, Trumbić and Smodlaka are protecting 
the Littoral alone [Dalmatia and Istria], and they care little for the rest.”17 In 
the following days, the dispute continued and it compelled Pašić to make his 
position clear. Apart from the pressing need to formulate territorial demands of 
the SCS Kingdom, Pašić was drawn out by Trumbić’s tactics. The latter tried 
to fasten on the nationality principle, invoking Regent Alexander’s manifest of 
6 January 1919, which had laid stress on the “ethnographic borders of our entire 
people,” and asking for expert advice on the ethnographic area of South Slavs. 
Pašić especially focused on the territorial settlement with Bulgaria, for which he 
prepared his own memorandum, and Romania in the Banat region, and brushed 
away Trumbić’s remarks. The Foreign Minister and Smodlaka agreed that cer-
tain revendications were needed to secure the Vardar and Timok valley from 
Bulgarian attacks, but insisted that these be demanded for security reasons and 
not based on the implausible ethnic claims of their Serbian colleagues. While 
Trumbić preferred to conceal the true motives of his considerations, Smodlaka 
was straightforward: he opposed a more extensive annexation of Bulgarian ter-
ritory because he believed that “the way we treat here Bulgarians, that is how 
Italy will treat us; with this, we give her cause and justification for her strategic 
encroachments on our territory.”18 
A recent analysis has stated that differences between Pašić and Trumbić 
emerged, at least partly, due to their conflicting ideologies, “the nationality prin-
ciple vs Realpolitik.”19 This appears to be a simplification of what in reality was 
hardly a clear-cut line of division. Pašić was mainly concerned with territorial 
acquisitions that would directly benefit pre-war Serbia and secure strategically 
more viable frontiers regardless of the nationality principle and especially at the 
expense of a former enemy. In that, he was a true practitioner of Realpolitik. 
Trumbić’s sole motivation by Wilsonian-minded principle of self-determination 
is highly doubtful, however. He did expound the nationality principle, but, in 
doing so, he was, just like Pašić, animated by more narrow “tribal” interests – 
delimitation of borders with Italy was an exclusively Croat (and Slovene) affair. 
17 Bogdan Krizman and Bogumil Hrabak, Zapisnici sa sednica delegacije Kraljevine SHS na 
Mirovnoj konferenciji u Parizu 1919–1920 (Belgrade: Institut društvenih nauka, 1960), 27.  
18 Ibid. 28–34; Miladin Milošević and Bora Dimitrijević, Nikola Pašić – Predsedniku 
vlade, strogo poverljivo, lično, Pariz, 1919–1920: Pašićeva pisma sa konferencije mira (Zaječar: 
Zadužbina “Nikola Pašić,” 2005), doc. 4, no. 40, Delegation to Protić, 27 January 1919, and 
doc. 5, no. 87, Delegation to Protić, 1 February 1919.  
19 Djokić, Pašić and Trumbić, 151. 
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A native of Dalmatia himself, Trumbić feared, along with Smodlaka, that Pašić’s 
strategic requirements concerning the Bulgarian or Hungarian border might 
undermine Yugoslav superior moral position in the Adriatic and lend justifica-
tion to excessive Italian claims. After all, it was hardly surprising that the Serb, 
Croat and Slovene delegates alike were more willing to make concessions when 
such losses were suffered by a “tribe” other than their own. Nevertheless, it has 
been rightly asserted that differences between them should not be overstated 
since “they maintained a remarkable show of unity when communicating with 
other delegations.”20 
As for Pašić’s general outlook on the conference, he was a careful observer 
of the workings of Great Powers in Paris despite their secretiveness and he had 
a great acumen to sense what was going on behind the scenes. In April 1919, 
Pašić penned an exceptionally perspicacious and prescient summary of his im-
pressions of the peace conference. He observed that the French territorial claims 
on the Rhineland and the Anglo-French stance on reparations weakened the 
tenets of peace-making expounded by Wilson; consequently, the President had 
to confine his more idealistic visions to the creation of the League of Nations 
designed to guard the peace of the world in future. Pašić was not taken in by 
the enthusiastic predictions of a new and better world, since he foresaw that the 
mirage of the League of Nations would not usher in an era of peace and stability. 
In his view, based on the decades-long experience, the conference in Paris was 
no different from the 1878 Treaty of Berlin in that the “Great Powers decide 
international questions according to their own understanding and appreciation.” 
Naturally, Pašić was mostly preoccupied with the issues that troubled the SCS 
delegation, and particularly the tortuous Adriatic question. By April the Yugo-
slavs had advanced proposals for President Wilson’s arbitration and a plebiscite 
to be held in the contested zones, only to find both initiatives flatly refused by 
Italy. Pašić pointed out the hypocrisy with which the Great Powers applied dif-
ferent principles in territorial disputes: 
True, everything must be subjected to a principle now: that of nationality where 
they [Great Powers] find it appropriate to apply that principle, then strategic 
principle where they find it appropriate to apply that principle, even if strategic 
principle is used not to protect the weaker nation from the stronger, but to use 
it against the weaker. To secure the stronger against the weaker, whose parts 
he ripped off from his entity, by taking other peoples’ territory. Then economic, 
trading principle would be used to give to cities other peoples’ lands and other 
peoples in order to prosper, to provide “hinterland,” as Bosnia and Hercegovina 
was given to Austria-Hungary to secure the life and trade of Dalmatia. ... Italy 
must be secured against future Yugoslavia which does not have a single war 
ship, because peace could be disturbed if another neighbouring state has war 
ships. Peace is secured not only when Italy has war ships, but also when all sea 
20 Ibid. 67. 
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ports are in her hands. For in that case she is a master and any danger of a con-
flict is excluded. This is how future peace is intended to be ensured. Brute force 
will reign in the future, just as it reigned before this war.21  
With this in view, Pašić clearly and succinctly formulated what the newly-mint-
ed SCS Kingdom could expect from the conference: “We will get what and as 
much as they find fit to give us.” Nevertheless, he did not despair and was con-
vinced that “our moral strength,” demonstrated in the horrors of the Great War, 
was such that “in future we will reverse and avenge the injustice we suffer now.”22 
Apparently, Pašić did not succumb to the illusion that the new order that was 
being created in Paris would be permanent or durable. He thus viewed any pro-
posal or a settlement from the standpoint of a position in which it would place 
the SCS Kingdom in case of a future conflict. For example, Pašić was dead set 
against the neutralisation of the Adriatic sea – the renunciation of the right to 
have a battle fleet – advocated by Trumbić, which he saw as an infringement on 
the sovereignty and an acceptance of Italy’s domination of Belgrade’s policy: 
Neutrality is perfectly in Italy’s interest, and to our detriment only. Italy can agree 
to it, but she will still have a large fleet at her disposal that she could use where 
and how she pleases. In case of war with Italy, we will be without a fleet and must 
place all our hope in the protection of the League of Nations, and it is doubt-
ful that we will have any real assistance from that quarter. With neutralisation, 
we become a second-rate state. Freedom is defended by blood and arms, not by 
neutralisation and other ideas. When Europe or the whole world splits into two 
camps and wages war, then all theories and ideas and the entire international law 
crumble. What good was neutrality to Belgium in 1914? Do we have any guaran-
tees that Italy will respect the neutrality of the Adriatic in case of war?23
Based on the experience of peace-making in Paris, Pašić informed his 
government that the Supreme Council carefully excluded the representatives of 
minor powers from interfering with its decisions. Those delegates were occa-
sionally invited to express their views on specific matters of immediate interest 
to their countries, but they were never told the Supreme Council’s decisions be-
fore these were announced to all, or terms of peace were given to an enemy state. 
They were, Pašić wrote, “held here for the sake of appearance, so that the world 
believes that they have some rights in resolving the matters; it is dreary, but that 
21 Nikola Pašić – Predsedniku vlade, doc. 19, Delegation to Protić, April 1919, personal, str. 
conf. [7463]. 
22 Ibid.; see also doc. 21, Delegation to Prime Minister, str. conf. no. 14, 15–17 April 1919. 
23 Zapisnici sa sednica delegacije Kraljevine SHS, 221. Pašić reaffirmed his scepticism with re-
gard to the League of Nations at the meeting of the Radical MPs held on 23 December 1920. 
Discussing international situation, he said for that organisation that it “does not give substan-
tial guarantees for the future peace. We are all now in that League: both the victors and the 
defeated”. See Djordje Radenković, Pašić i Jugoslavija (Belgrade: Službeni list SRJ, 1999), 538. 
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is the true state of things.”24 Nevertheless, he was an arch realist and, as such, 
convinced that the only way for the delegation of a small power to have a mea-
sure of success was in close cooperation with Great Powers, former Serbia’s allies 
and the sole arbiters at the conference – with the exception of Italy. Through 
Vesnić’s regular communication with the Quai d’Orsay, Pašić was alert to French 
point of view and had an opportunity to sound out the Allies.25 He confirmed 
his cautious attitude towards the Entente Powers on several occasions. When 
Trumbić wanted to raise officially the question of relations between the SCS 
Kingdom and Italy, France and Britain insofar these Great Powers were bound 
by the Treaty of London and still acted as arbiters of the Italo-SCS conflict 
within the Supreme Council, Pašić opposed his proposal.26 For all its legal logic 
and fair-mindedness, such protest was outside the realm of political reality. Pašić 
also made clear his disagreement with the Cabinet’s proposal to threaten Yugo-
slavia’s withdrawal from the conference in case the Entente Powers refused to 
invalidate the Treaty of London or hand the Adriatic question to Wilson for 
arbitration. In his view, such a break with the Allies would be “fatal” in Yugosla-
via’s parlous financial and political position.27 In May 1919, Pašić was the only 
one out of five delegates who voted for the proposition that the entire former 
Austro-Hungarian territory should pay reparations rather than just new Aus-
tria and Hungary.28 This was clearly a heavy burden for his country, but he seems 
to have accepted it as inevitable in light of the Entente’s political will. In this con-
nection, Pašić’s handling of the minority clause of the St. Germain Peace Treaty 
with Austria, designed to protect the rights of minorities in the successor states, 
was also of interest. He set his face against signing the St. Germain Treaty – to-
gether with Bošković and against the opinion of five other delegates – since the 
application of the minority clause would extend to Macedonia,  pre-1914 Ser-
bian territory. This was such an upalatable demand that Ljubomir Davidović’s 
Cabinet resigned in protest. Finally, Pašić changed his mind on 12 November 
and advised the government to sign the treaty faced with the threat that the sign-
ing of a treaty with Bulgaria could come into question and realizing there could 
be further trouble in financial matters.29 
24 Nikola Pašić – Predsedniku vlade, doc. 52, Delegation to Davidović, str. conf. no. 67, 30 
August 1919. 
25 Zapisi Dra Josipa Smodlake, 161. 
26 Zapisnici sa sednica delegacije Kraljevine SHS, 50–52; Bogdan Krizman, “Jadransko pitan-
je pred našom delegacijom na Pariškoj mirovnoj konferenciji do potpisivanja ugovora s 
Njemačkom (28. lipnja 1919.)”, Jadranski zbornik III (1958), 293–294.    
27 Nikola Pašić – Predsedniku vlade, doc. 13, str. conf. no. 1, Delegation to Protić, 13 March 1919. 
28 Zapisnici sa sednica delegacije Kraljevine SHS, 126–127. 
29 Ibid. 182–183; Bogumil Hrabak, Zapisnici sednica Davidovićeve dve vlade od avgusta 1919. 
do februara 1920, Arhivski vjesnik XII (1970), 23–24, 55. 
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With small powers being ignored at the conference, there were only two 
ways in which the SCS delegation could influence decision-makers, aside from 
propaganda activities. First, it issued numerous memoranda that expounded its 
views on particular territorial issues and were submitted formally to the Su-
preme Council. Pašić took a lead in this respect and himself drafted a number of 
memoranda regarding all the disputed border areas.30 Second, the delegates en-
deavoured, as Pašić explained to Belgrade, to “get in touch privately with certain 
experts in various commissions, who are entrusted with studying and making 
reports on the questions, which are of interest to us, under the guise of provid-
ing new information on the matter they examine or informing ourselves if the 
questions have been resolved and how etc.”31 This informal form of lobbying was 
usually more effective if the delegate managed to establish close relations with 
an expert whom he tried to win over for the Yugoslav cause. Pašić was engaged 
personally in lobbying important individuals, who held positions in the territo-
rial commissions and belonged to the delegations of the Principal Allies. Among 
others, he had conversations with André Tardieu, chairman of the Commission 
on Romanian and Yugoslav Affairs; Philip Kerr, Lloyd George’s private secre-
tary, President Wilson and Frank Polk, American plenipotentiary delegate.32 In 
Lederer’s estimation, Pašić’s interview with Wilson on 17 April 1919 was a suc-
cess and it influenced the President to Yugoslavs’ benefit.33 On the other hand, 
his efforts to arrange a meeting with Lloyd George bore no fruit.34 
Pašić’s attitude towards the particularly grave and long-drawn-out Adri-
atic controversy requires special attention. His fellow delegate Smodlaka has 
asserted that Pašić, and Serbs in general, were rather indifferent to the Adriatic 
question, all the more so if intransigence in this matter militated against their 
30 Archives of the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts [hereafter ASANU], Nikola Pašić 
Papers, no. 9874, The Ethnographic Border between the Slovenes and Italians, The Serbo-
Croat-German-Hungarian Border, Delimitation with Romania in the Banat, Delimitation 
with Bulgaria; see also Pašić’s handwritten drafts in no. 14528/VIII-11, Serbo-Bulgarian 
Relations and the Rectification of the Border; no. 14528/VIII-18, Delimitation between the 
Serbs and Hungarians in Bačka; no. 14528/VIII-23, Notes and statistical data on the Banat 
and Baranja; no. 14528/VIII-31, Albania.  
31 Nikola Pašić – Predsedniku vlade, doc. 52, Delegation to Davidović, str. conf. no. 67, 30 
August 1919.  
32 Nikola Pašić – Predsedniku vlade, doc. 12, Delegation to Protić, no. 510, 8 March 1919; 
doc. 23, Delegation to Prime Minister, str. conf. no. 17, 18 April 1919; doc. 49, Delegation to 
Prime Minister, str. conf. no. 64, 14 August 1919. 
33 Lederer, Yugoslavia at the Paris Peace Conference, 194. To prepare the ground for Wilson’s 
favourable reception of the Serbian claims against Bulgaria, Pašić had sent him the text of the 
two secret treaties concluded by Bulgaria with Austria-Hungary and Germany during the 
war (ASANU, Pašić Papers, no. 14528/II-12, Wilson to Pashitch, 1 April 1919). 
34 ASANU, Pašić Papers, no. 11571/26, Philip Kerr to Pachitch, 15 September 1919. 
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desiderata on the Hungarian, Romanian, Bulgarian and Albanian border, where 
Italians invariably obstructed Serbian interests.35 Such view was no doubt af-
fected by later Serbo-Croat differences, but it was nevertheless accepted in much 
of the Yugoslav communist historiography.36 However, there is no evidence for 
such sweeping claims. On the contrary, the record shows that Pašić supported 
the Croat delegates who insisted in late June 1919 that the minimum territo-
rial programme in the Adriatic be specified beyond which there would be no 
further concessions to Italy. Besides allowing for “a few islands to come under 
the League of Nations, with a plebiscite to follow later,” Pašić professed that any 
other concession would “encroach on the vital interests of the state.”37 In this 
respect, Pašić’s view was opposite to that of a fellow Serb Bošković, who argued 
for a speedy agreement with Italy in order to improve Yugoslav prospects for 
more favourable territorial settlement in the eastern parts of the country.38 The 
head of the SCS delegation further elaborated his views in a lengthy letter to the 
government in Belgrade in early January 1920. Besides specifying the maximum 
concessions that could be given to Rome, in accordance with the opinion of the 
delegation, he warned that the thrust of Italian policy was to create a situation 
in which the SCS Kingdom would be placed at its mercy. Through subversion 
and policy of encirclement with the Yugoslav neighbours, Italy would “surround 
us with agitations and disturbances, and put pressure on us from all sides to 
surrender and pursue such policy that would be in her interest.”39 Thus Pašić 
looked at the problem of relations with Italy not as a matter of territorial bar-
gaining that concerned one province of the country more than the other, but 
rather from the point of view of the Kingdom as a whole with all its geopolitical 
implications. He doggedly maintained that Italian sovereignty had to be rejected 
at any point along the coast from Pula southwards, including the islands.40 Far 
from neglecting northern Adriatic, as Smodlaka contended, Pašić and, for that 
matter, the Belgrade government took care not to sacrifice Croatian interests 
there. It was no coincidence that Trumbić always set the tone of Yugoslav policy 
towards Italy. 
35 Zapisi Dra Josipa Smodlake, 145–146. 
36 E.g. see Julijana Vrčinac, “Spoljna politika Jugoslavije u periodu 1919–1941 godine”, in Dr-
agi Milenković, ed., Iz istorije Jugoslavije 1918–1945 (Belgrade: Nolit, 1958), 304.
37 Zapisnici sa sednica delegacije Kraljevine SHS, 155–156. 
38 Mitrović, Jugoslavija na Konferenciji mira, 163–167.
39 Jadransko pitanje od Pariza do Rapala: zvanični dokumenti (Belgrade: Državna štamparija 
Kraljevine Srba, Hrvata i Slovenaca, 1924), no. 7, Pašić to Davidović, 7 January 1920, Delimi-
tation between the SCS Kingdom and Italy. 
40 Ibid.; Zapisnici sa sednica delegacije Kraljevine SHS, 231.
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An important part of the Adriatic question concerned the status of Alba-
nia and, for that reason, Pašić referred to her as “the object of compensation”.41 It 
could have hardly been otherwise as Italian troops had occupied most of Alba-
nia on the basis of an inter-Allied military agreement. The Serbian army was in 
control of northern region of the country; it had to evacuate the town of Scutari 
under the duress of Allied pressure.42 According to the Treaty of London, Italy 
was to have the port of Valona and her hinterland and an exclusive influence in 
the rest of Albania, save the northern parts with the town of Scutari to be di-
vided between Serbia and Montenegro and those in the south which should be 
attached to Greece. The SCS government firmly believed it was a matter of vital 
importance not to allow Italy to acquire the full sovereignty over Valona and her 
environs, and secure a complete control over the rest of Albania under the pretext 
of a League of Nations mandate. In the mind of the policy-makers in Belgrade, 
Italian entrenchment in Albania was a repetition of the unfortunate experience 
with the Austro-Hungarian mandate in Bosnia and Herzegovina.43 The Italian 
money, arms and propaganda fostered turmoil deep into the Yugoslav territory, 
in the provinces of Kosovo, Metohija and Macedonia with considerable Alba-
nian population, as well as in Montenegro among the supporters of the former 
king, Nikola I Petrović, and furnished ample justification for Belgrade’s fears.44 
From the strategic point of view the Yugoslavs were also frightened of the peril 
of Italians “joining hands” from Albania with the Bulgarians across the Vardar 
valley in Serb Macedonia, thus cutting off the vital Belgrade-Salonica railway 
in the same fashion the Bulgarian army had actually done in 1915.45 The stance 
on the Albanian question was formed accordingly. The SCS delegation in Paris 
plumped for the independence of Albania in her 1913 frontiers, after the First 
41 Ljubodrag Dimić and Djordje Borozan, eds., Jugoslovenska država i Albanci, 2 vols. (Bel-
grade: Službeni list SRJ, Arhiv Jugoslavije, Vojno-istorijski institut, 1998), I, no. 968, Pašić to 
Davidović, 23 December 1919. 
42 Dimo Vujović, “Oslobodjenje Skadra 1918. godine i stanje na crnogorsko-albanskoj grani-
ci”, Istorijski zapisi 1 (1960), 93–128. 
43 Jugoslovenska država i Albanci I, no. 852, Pašić to Protić, 18 April 1919; no. 968, Pašić 
to Davidović, 23 December 1919; no. 972, Memorandum on Albania submitted to Wilson 
[American President], undated; Jugoslovenska država i Albanci II, no. 12, The position of the 
Yugoslav delegation in relation to the memorandum of 9 December 1919, 8 January 1920. 
44 Vuk Vinaver, “Italijanska akcija protiv Jugoslavije na albansko-jugoslovenskoj granici 1918–
1920. godine”, Istorijski zapisi, 3 (1966), 477–515; Dušan T. Bataković, “Srpsko-arbanaški 
sporovi oko razgraničenja i arbanaška emigracija sa Kosova i Metohije (1918–1920)”, in 
Kosovo i Metohija u srpsko-arbanaškim odnosima (Belgrade: Čigoja štampa, 2006), 279–298; 
Dmitar Tasić, Rat posle rata: vojska Kraljevine Srba, Hrvata i Slovenaca na Kosovu i Metohiji i 
u Makedoniji 1918–1920, 2nd ed. (Belgrade: Službeni glasnik, 2012).
45 Jugoslovenska država i Albanci II, no. 14, Dr Trumbić’s expose at the meeting of the allied 
Prime Ministers on 10 and 12 January 1920.
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Balkan War, under the slogan “the Balkans for the Balkan peoples.” Only if the 
stance of Great Powers had rendered that independence impossible to achieve, 
the delegates should have fallen back on the reserve policy – the absorption of 
the northern parts as far as the Drin river in order to gain the strategically more 
viable border.46 
To be sure, Pašić must have had his eye on the northern part of Albania 
centred on Scutari. Prior to the Great War, he had sought an outlet to sea for 
land-locked Serbia over the Albanian soil in the direction of the ports of San 
Giovanni di Medua and Durres. In fact, Austria-Hungary had promoted the 
formation of an independent Albania in 1913 to prevent Serbia’s access to the 
Adriatic. Nevertheless, in 1919, Pašić appreciated that obtaining the northern 
Albania at the price of having Italian troops permanently established in a stra-
tegically sensitive position for a new and still fragile state was too high a price to 
pay. He thus adhered to the official policy of the delegation and the SCS King-
dom, as evidenced by all the documents he produced. But Pašić advocated an 
active approach to Albanians to win them over to follow Yugoslavia’s lead in op-
posing Italian protectorate for which no effort and expense should be spared. In 
Paris, he himself worked with Essad-pasha Toptani, who had been the fulcrum 
of Serbian influence in Albania since before the war and remained so until his 
murder in June 1920.47 Pašić also prompted Protić to revive previous agitation 
among the Albanian tribesmen in the north with a view to stiffening their re-
sistance to Italian penetration. For that purpose, he recommended a restoration 
of the “Albanian department” in the Foreign Ministry.48 It was, however, Protić’s 
successor Davidović who accepted his suggestion. The special Albanian section 
of the Political Department of the Foreign Ministry (also known as the Fourth 
section) was formed in August 1919 under direct control of Prime Minister to 
oversee and coordinate Albanian policy.49 Pašić’s pursuit of active involvement 
in Albania was clearly a policy of insurance in case the Italians remained in that 
46 Dragan Bakić, “The Italo-Yugoslav Conflict over Albania: a View from Belgrade, 1919–
1939”, Diplomacy & Statecraft 25/4 (2014), 592–594.      
47 ASANU, Pašić Papers, no. 14528, VIII-32, Pašić to Protić, personal, str. conf., no. 1974, 3 
June 1919; for the background see Dušan T. Bataković, “Esad-paša Toptani i Srbija (1912–
1915)”, and “Esad-paša Toptani, Srbija i albansko pitanje (1916–1918)”, in Kosovo i Meto-
hija u srpsko-arbanaškim odnosima (Belgrade: Čigoja štampa, 2006), 201–237 and 257–298 
respectively.  
48 ASANU, Pašić Papers, no. 14528, VIII-32, Pašić to Protić, no. 36, undated but late January 
1919; Nikola Pašić – Predsedniku vlade, doc. 16, str. conf. no. 8, 20 March 1919;  Zapisnici sa 
sednica delegacije Kraljevine SHS, 207–209.  
49 ASANU, Ivan Subotić Papers, 14576-V-4, Albania, The history of our policy in Albania 
in 1920 based on the Foreign Ministry’s Archives, Dossier Ar. 1- The situation in Albania, 
folio 1; The history of our policy in Albania in 1921, Subotić to Mitrović, 1 September 1933, 
conf. no. 15656/34, folio 79. 
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country; his actions bore the mark of his experience of Albanian affairs before 
and during the war. It is certainly unfounded to claim that “the cynical old man” 
hoped that Italy would dismiss the notion of the 1913 independent Albania 
and thus enable the SCS Kingdom to have Scutari.50 Such contention assumes 
that he attached greater importance to obtaining northern Albania than to hav-
ing the Italians removed from the country and deprived of a base for further 
inroad in the Balkans – and that is entirely unconvincing. The same author is 
much closer to the mark when he claims that Pašić came to doubt the likelihood 
of maintaining Albanian independence, which Wilson’s declaration of 23 April 
seems to have confirmed.51 Indeed, in September, Pašić penned a draft memo-
randum for the conference in which he advanced Yugoslav demands after “hav-
ing been convinced that the Peace Conference does not intend to carry out the 
1913 London agreement on Albania and does not intend to request from Italy to 
abandon Valona and her surroundings.”52 In such circumstances, he demanded 
the border on the Black Drin and Drin rivers, but also requested a plebiscite for 
the Mirdites and Malissors tribes, situated on the other side of the Drin, with 
a view to including them in the SCS Kingdom as an autonomous region. Pašić 
archived this note “until the time has come to submit it to the conf[erence].” 
Pašić’s views markedly departed from those of other delegates in the af-
termath of the Lloyd George-Clemenceau ultimatum of 14 January 1920. The 
British and French premiers presented a settlement of the Adriatic question on 
the following terms: the town of Fiume (Rijeka) and Zara (Zadar) to become 
free states under the guarantee of the League of Nations and the right to choose 
which country would represent them diplomatically; a corridor along the coast 
to link Fiume with Italy’s territory; the islands of Lošinj, Palagruža and Vis to 
be ceded to Rome; Italy’s sovereignty over Valona and the division of the rest of 
Albania between the SCS Kingdom and Greece, with the remainder to come 
under Italian mandate.53 Lloyd George and Clemenceau threatened the Yugo-
slav delegation with the integral execution of the Treaty of London if Belgrade 
failed to comply. The ultimatum clearly tried to play on the card of compensat-
ing the SCS Kingdom in northern Albania for the concessions in Fiume and 
thus satisfying both the Italians and Yugoslavs. Krizman’s study suggests that 
Regent Alexander, who was in Paris in early January and saw much of Lloyd 
George, was responsible for such a move: he made no secret of his opinion that 
50 Mitrović, Jugoslavija na Konferenciji mira, 120, 169.   
51 Andrej Mitrović, “Mirovna delegacija Kraljevine SHS i deklaracija V. Vilsona od 23. aprila 
1919”, Zbornik Filozofskog fakulteta (Belgrade) X/1 (1968), 488. 
52 ASANU, Pašić Papers, no. 14528, VIII-34, Concept of a note on Albania, no. 4305, 2 
September 1919.
53 Ferdo Šišić, Jadransko pitanje na Konferenciji mira u Parizu: zbirka akata i dokumenata (Za-
greb: Matica hrvatska, 1920), doc. XXVI. 
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acquiring Scutari and saving the Slovenes from the formation of an état-tampon 
around Fiume was more important than the latter town.54 Lacking any clear-cut 
instructions from the government, the burden of decision-making was placed on 
the delegates whose opinion was divided. 
Trumbić believed that the moment was not decisive. He was against the 
14 January proposal and even claimed that he preferred the execution of the 
Treaty of London as less harmful to the essential interests of the country. He 
suggested to propose to Belgrade giving an evasive reply to the ultimatum and 
the other delegates, except Pašić, agreed. The latter was concerned about the 
consequences of refusing the Entente’s proposal and decided to send his per-
sonal opinion to the government.55 Indeed, in a letter written later that day Pašić 
argued for the acceptance of the Entente’s offer in principle as being less of an 
evil than the Treaty of London – he still wanted to ask for the border proposed 
by Wilson in April 1919 and the exclusion of the port of Baroš from the Fiuman 
state. Characteristically, Pašić looked into the future: he thought that neither 
solution would resolve the conflict with Italy definitely. He also insisted on the 
importance of maintaining “not just sympathies, but also support of the Entente 
in a possible dispute with Italy”.56 This was in keeping with Pašić’s conviction 
that any solution to the Adriatic question reached in a bilateral arrangement 
with Italy would be less favourable to the SCS Kingdom than that in a settle-
ment underwritten by the Allies.57 And the Entente Powers were anxious to dis-
pose of the Adriatic question before the fast-approaching end of the conference. 
On the other hand, Pašić was concerned about the capabilities of his country to 
withstand the prolonged period of tensions and dangers of a conflict. With this 
in view, he warned his colleagues in the delegation that it was time to settle the 
problem; their playing for time raised the question “what would situation be in 
time, whether [it would be] better or worse.”58 It was, however, President Wilson 
who relieved the Yugoslavs of their dilemma, since he torpedoed Lloyd George’s 
and Clemenceau’s initiative.  
The Italo-Yugoslav conflict outlived the peace conference. Pašić and 
Trumbić remained charged with conducting direct negotiations with the Ital-
ians as Britain and France dropped their mediating role. Trumbić was proved 
correct in his contention that the January ultimatum was not a decisive moment. 
Pašić was, however, right in his estimation that the position of the SCS King-
dom vis-à-vis Italy would grow weaker, if it was left to deal with Rome alone, 
54 Bogdan Krizman, “Saveznički ultimatum u jadranskom pitanju siječnja 1920. godine”, 
Jadranski zbornik 2(1957), 213.  
55 Zapisnici sa sednica delegacije Kraljevine SHS, 250–251. 
56 Jadransko pitanje od Pariza do Rapala, no. 33, Pašić to Davidović, 24 January 1920.  
57 ASANU, Nikola Pašić Papers, no. 11573, Pašić’s note, no date. 
58 Zapisnici sa sednica delegacije Kraljevine SHS, 254–255. 
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on a strictly bilateral basis. This was apparent in the instructions that Prime 
Minister Protić sent to Pašić and Trumbić before their meeting with the Ital-
ian delegation in Pallanza in May 1920. The two plenipotentiaries were given 
complete freedom to negotiate and specifically allowed to agree to full Italian 
sovereignty over Fiume, if they found it absolutely necessary.59 But these talks 
were interrupted due to the resignation of the Francesco Nitti Cabinet in Rome. 
The last phase of the Adriatic question took place under the premiership of 
Vesnić, a former delegate in Paris. Pašić appreciated that resistance to Italy was 
going to collapse and he declined on account of ill-health to participate again 
in the SCS delegation. The government then appointed Vesnić, Trumbić and 
Kosta Stojanović, the Minister of Finance, to travel to Santa Margherita and 
continue the negotiations.60 Before the Yugoslavs left for Italy and during their 
talks with Count Sforza, the Italian Foreign Minister, Britain and France, in 
particular, made it clear to Belgrade that it was imperative to reach an agreement 
with Rome and that it could not count on their mediation in case of failure.61 
By this time, Wilson’s political position in America had become so precarious 
that his potential intervention on behalf of the Yugoslavs was out of the ques-
tion. Diplomatically isolated and with mounting difficulties at home, the SCS 
delegation faced increased Italian demands and had to yield – the result was the 
Treaty of Rapallo concluded on 12 November 1920.62 Italy was given more terri-
tory including the Snežnik plateau in the Dinaric Alps and territorial continuity 
with Fiume, which would become an independent state; Italian sovereignty was 
recognised over the islands of Cres, Lušinj, Lastovo, Palagruža and the small 
town of Zara with its Italian majority in the midst of the Slav population. With 
the incorporation of Snežnik, Italy was given “around 2,000 square kilometres 
and around 100,000 inhabitants more than she requested in January this year in 
Paris, and all the railway from Logatec to Rijeka, which was supposed to remain 
in our state in its entirety.”63 Clearly, the final Adriatic settlement was a dismal 
failure for the Yugoslavs and it confirmed Pašić’s political foresight. 
In the wake of the January 1920 ultimatum, Pašić was mainly concerned 
with Albania. He had reason to believe, based on the experience with the Lloyd 
George-Clemenceau proposals, that it would be possible to attain his desiderata 
59 Archives of Serbia [hereafter AS], Varia Collection, V-73, Protić to Pašić and Trumbić, str. 
conf. no. 204, 7 May 1920.  
60 AS, Varia Collection, V-65, The Adriatic Question, memorandum by Milan Antić [Coun-
cellor at the Foreign Ministry], 25 February 1922, fols. 391–392. 
61 Vojislav Jovanović, Rapalski ugovor: zbirka dokumenata (Belgrade: Udruženje novinara 
Narodne Republike Srbije, 1950), docs. 10–29, 35, 42, 60.
62 Ibid. doc. 46; Vesnić, Milenko Vesnić, 540–554.
63 Jadransko pitanje od Pariza do Rapala, no. 112, Vesnić [from Santa Margherita] to 
[Momčilo] Ninčić [Deputy Foreign Minister in Belgrade], 10 November 1920. 
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in the north of that country. He urged the Cabinet in Belgrade to realise that 
Italy would be allowed to set her foot firmly in central Albania and that “we have 
to demand different and better frontier in the direction of the Albanian ter-
ritories which would fall under Italian protectorate.”64 In the first half of 1920, 
he remained in contact with Tihomir Popović, his close associate in the For-
eign Ministry, who kept him informed about the developments in Albania and 
the actions of Serbian agents in that country. After the assassination of Essad-
pasha, Pašić suggested an agreement with certain Marturi and other Albanian 
leaders with a view to expelling Italians and establishing some form of a con-
federation between the SCS Kingdom and Albania. His ambitious plan also 
envisaged an absorption of northern Albania as part of an agreement with the 
Albanians.65 During the negotiations with the Italians in London in February 
1920, Trumbić suspected Pašić of having his heart set on northern Albania to 
the exclusion of Fiume and, moreover, of dealing with Lloyd George behind the 
scenes.66 There is, however, no evidence of any underhand deal with the British 
premier. The situation changed during the summer of 1920 when the rebellious 
Albanians drove Italian forces out of the country with the exception of the small 
island of Saseno off Valona. The Serbian army defeated the advancing Albanian 
forces and moved its positions further beyond the demarcation line held since 
the war.67 Tirana took the initiative before the League to have her independence 
recognised – Albania was admitted to the Geneva organisation on 20 December 
1921 – and consequently obtain the withdrawal of foreign troops from her soil. 
The League transferred the discussion of frontier problems in Albania to the 
Conference of Ambassadors, a permanent organisation of the Allied Ambas-
sadors at Paris charged with the execution of the peace treaties. 
After year and a half absence during the peace-making, Pašić returned 
to the SCS Kingdom and, on 1 January 1921, became Prime Minister – he 
also served as his own Foreign Minister. With the exception of the short-lived 
Davidović Cabinet (27 July – 6 November 1924), he would retain premiership 
until April 1926 and have a role in the conduct of foreign policy. Much of it had 
to do with the execution of the peace settlement, at least in early years.   
64 Ivo Andrić, Diplomatski spisi, ed. Miladin Milošević (Belgrade: Prosveta, 1992), Doc. 118, 
Memorandum written by Ivo Andrić, 30 January 1939, 216–226, 221. 
65 ASANU, Nikola Pašić Papers, no. 11712, Popović to Pašić, 12 March 1920; Bora 
Dimitrijević and Jelica Ilić, Zaostavština iz Toronta, 1903–1926 (Zaječar: Zadužbina “Nikola 
Pašić,” 2015), docs. 41–42, Pašić to Popović, no date and 20 June 1920 respectively. 
66 Mitrović, Jugoslavija na Konferenciji mira, 175; Lederer, Yugoslavia at the Paris Peace Confer-
ence, 276–281.   
67 Desanka Todorović, Jugoslavija i balkanske države 1918–1923 (Belgrade: Narodna knjiga, 
1979), 70–78.  
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The greatest danger for the SCS Kingdom and the newly-established or-
der in Danubian Europe emanated from Hungary. The Treaty of Trianon was 
not signed before 4 June 1920 and the Hungarian ruling circles denounced the 
mutilation of the lands of the Crown of St. Stephen. Hungarian revanchist as-
pirations were linked with the possibility of a Habsburg restoration. For the 
SCS Kingdom, as well as Czechoslovakia and Romania, such prospect spelled 
an immense danger. These countries were unsettled with sizeable Magyar and 
German national minorities that would be naturally attracted to a Habsburg 
monarchy to which, after all, they had pledged their allegiance for centuries. All 
malcontents, especially in Croatia, could rally under the Habsburg banner to 
further their aims.68 In the spring of 1919, Pašić and the entire Yugoslav delega-
tion in Paris refused the Entente Powers’ demand to contribute troops to sup-
press the Bolshevist revolution in Hungary, since they suspected a plot to restore 
the Habsburgs and revive some sort of a dual Austro-Hungarian state. To assist 
such a development in Hungary, Pašić was adamant, would be a “colossal sin 
that would destroy our unity and freedom”.69 In early 1920, there seemed to be 
the real danger of an attempt to reinstate the Archduke Joseph, and Belgrade 
and Prague joined forces to bring pressure to bear on the Conference of Am-
bassadors to prevent it. On 2 February 1920, the Allied Ambassadors accepted 
the resolution stating that the restoration of the Habsburg dynasty would be 
“neither recognised nor tolerated” by the Allied Powers.70 The Yugoslavs, Roma-
nians and Czechoslovaks wanted to have all the dynasties that had waged war 
on the Entente Powers and their smaller allies explicitly banned from taking the 
reins of government,71 but this was never effected. 
The ex-emperor of Austria-Hungary, Karl I Habsburg – who had 
reigned in Hungary as King Károly IV – was in exile in Switzerland and he 
intended to reclaim his throne. It was with a view to preventing a Habsburg 
restoration and safeguarding the status quo that Czechoslovakia and Yugosla-
via signed on 14 August 1920 a defensive treaty directed against Hungary, thus 
initiating the alliance which came to be known as the Little Entente. Italy and 
Yugoslavia concluded their anti-Habsburg convention which formed part of the 
68 Bogumil Hrabak, “Frankovačka emigrantska secesionistička organizacija i Hrvatska legija 
u Madjarskoj (1919–1921)”, Zbornik Matice srpske za istoriju 56 (1997), 97–123. 
69 Nikola Pašić – Predsedniku vlade, doc. 20. Delegation to Prime Minister, str. conf. no. 13, 14 
April 1919; for a discussion of the Habsburg problem see Mitrović, Jugoslavija na Konferenciji 
mira, 186–192. 
70 Documents on British Foreign Policy, ed. Ernest Woodward and Rohan Butler (London: 
HMSO, 1946–), ser. I, vol. XII, no. 80, Derby (Paris) to Curzon, 2 February 1920; the text 
of the resolution is annexed. 
71 Archives of Yugoslavia [hereafter AJ], London Legation, fond 341, fascicle I, Pašić to 
Gavrilović, 28 February 1920, conf. no. 64. 
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Rapallo Treaty.72 The Little Entente soon came to be tested. On 24 March 1921, 
Karl Habsburg sneaked out of his exile and reached Hungary via Austria. The 
escapade was met by a firm attitude on the part of Pašić who embarked on an 
energetic action in order to evict Karl from Hungary. He immediately proposed 
to Czechoslovakia, Romania and Italy to make a joint demarche in Budapest 
to the effect that their ministers would be withdrawn from Hungary if Karl 
did not leave the country; to jointly request from France and Britain to support 
their action in Budapest; and to lodge a protest in Bern because it allowed Karl 
to endanger European peace.73 However, the Hungarian Regent, Miklós Hor-
thy, persuaded the ex-emperor to leave Hungary, which the latter eventually did 
under the protection of the officers of the Entente Powers.  
Karl’s adventure had an important and lasting consequence insofar Ro-
mania joined the Little Entente: she signed an agreement with Czechoslova-
kia just eighteen days after Karl’s expulsion from Hungary (23 April). On 7 
June 1921, Pašić and the Romanian Prime Minister, Take Ionescu, concluded 
an agreement on the same lines in Belgrade. As Pašić put it to Beneš, this was 
“a significant accomplishment the purpose of which is to maintain peace and 
secure the peace treaties which are the foundation of the future of our coun-
tries.” To further stress Beneš’s contribution, who was in London at the time and 
thus unable to come to Belgrade, Pašić wrote that it was the moment “when our 
plans are coming into being and our work is being completed”.74 However, on 21 
October 1921, Karl and the ex-empress Zita flew into Hungary, gathered some 
loyal troops and again descended on Budapest. Horthy reacted with force and 
stopped him after a minor skirmish on the outskirts of the capital. The Little 
Entente reacted even more decisively than in March and mobilization was or-
dered and implemented in Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia, though not in Roma-
nia. The Conference of Ambassadors struck a balance between Hungary and her 
neighbours: Budapest was requested to declare all the Habsburgs barred from 
wearing the crown of St. Stephen and the Little Entente to refrain from military 
measures. In early November, the Hungarian National Assembly passed a law 
72 Carlo Sforza, Diplomatic Europe since the Treaty of Versailles (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 1928), 101–102; Ivo Lederer, Yugoslavia at the Paris Peace Conference, 307. 
73 AJ, London Legation, 341, fascicle I, confidential archive for 1921, Pašić to Prague, Rome 
and Bucharest Legations [forwarded to London Legation], 2 April 1921, conf. no. 4130; for 
an account of the Habsburg restoration attempts see Djordje Knežević, “Kraljevina Srba, 
Hrvata i Slovenaca i dva neuspela pokušaja restauracije Habsburga 1921. godine”, Vojnoistori-
jski glasnik 18/1 (1967), 117–138 and Vuk Vinaver, Jugoslavija i Mađarska 1918–1933 (Bel-
grade: Institut za savremenu istoriju, 1971), 153–160. 
74 AJ, London Legation, 341, fascicle 1, confidential archive for 1921, Pašić to Gavrilović, 8 
June 1921, conf. no. 7222; also Pašić to Gavrilović, 31 May 1921, str. conf. no. 486; Gavrilović 
to Pašić, 3 June 1921.   
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which excluded the House of Habsburg from the throne.75 Pašić endeavoured 
in vain to utilise the crisis to wrest from the Entente Powers an effective disar-
mament of Hungary in which the Little Entente countries would take part.76 
Finally, the Conference of Ambassadors arranged for the former sovereign to be 
removed from Hungary – he was interned on the Portuguese island of Madeira 
where he died in April 1922. Pašić also had to comply with the terms of the 
Trianon Treaty unfavourable to Belgrade, after having attempted to retain the 
possession of the entire province of Baranja assigned to Hungary. He informed 
Bošković, now the SCS delegate at the Conference of Ambassadors, that the 
Serbian troops had withdrawn from northern parts of Baranja by 26 August 
1921.77   
As has been seen, Romania’s adherence to the treaties between Czecho-
slovakia and the SCS Kingdom completed the formation of the Little Entente, 
which would remain a permanent feature of international affairs in interwar 
Europe. Ionescu and Pašić also dealt with the final delimitation of the border 
between the two countries and, for that purpose, they decided to form joint 
committees.78 The Romano-SCS alliance was further fortified through dynastic 
link. Pašić accompanied King Alexander in February 1922 to attend the betroth-
al ceremony in Bucharest between the latter and Princess Mărioara (Marija), 
a daughter of King Ferdinand and Queen Marie of Romania – their wedding 
followed in June. Notwithstanding some minor differences concerning the treat-
ment of Romanian minority, relations between the two neighbouring countries 
were cordial, largely due to their foreign policy alignment.  
In the Balkans, the main attention of Pašić’s foreign policy was riveted 
to Albania and Bulgaria. As for the former country, Pašić renewed his efforts to 
ensure diplomatic support for the change of border in favour of the SCS King-
dom. On his instructions, Mihailo Gavrilović, the Yugoslav Minister in London, 
sounded the Foreign Office in June 1921 as to their attitude towards the delimi-
tation on the Drin river which would leave the port of San Giovani di Medua 
on the Yugoslav side, but he was met with firm disapproval.79 At the same time, 
the Yugoslav delegate at the Conference of Ambassadors explained at length to 
75 Knežević, “Kraljevina Srba, Hrvata i Slovenaca i dva neuspela pokušaja restauracije Habs-
burga 1921. godine”; Vuk Vinaver, Jugoslavija i Mađarska, 175–185. 
76 AJ, London Legation, 341, fascicle 1, confidential archive for 1921, Pašić to Gavrilović, 3 
November 1921, conf. no. 277 [contains a copy of a note sent to the Czechoslovak and Ro-
manian governments].  
77 AJ, Bucharest Legation, 395-5-50, Pašić to Čolak Antić, 24 September 1921, conf. no. 
11538. 
78 AJ, Bucharest Legation, 395-5-57: Procès verbal I, Minutes from the meeting between 
Pašić and Ionescu, 7 June 1921. 
79 Todorović, Jugoslavija i balkanske države, 128–129. 
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his French colleague Jules Laroche, the Under-Secretary at the Quai d’Orsay, 
the need for Yugoslavia of having a secure frontier line towards Albania. The 
Frenchman asserted, however, that diplomatic constellation was such as not to 
admit of any substantial changes in the status quo, and reminded of the great 
opportunity lost at the Peace Conference when what he termed “French project” 
had been seized on by Pašić but declined by the Belgrade government.80 A later 
retrospective of Yugoslav policy during this time recorded that “Pašić conducted 
negotiations with the Italians in July 1921 and agreed on the division of Albania 
between us and Italy under condition that we got a more favourable solution 
than that envisaged by the Treaty of London of 1915.”81 There is no documen-
tary evidence to support this claim and it seems contrary to the thrust of Pašić’s 
policy to keep Italy out of Albania and the Balkans – the Italians were then re-
duced to the island of Sasseno – although he did hanker after an opportunity to 
obtain the northern regions. Pašić certainly tried to create a favourable situation 
for the SCS Kingdom’s interests on the ground. For that purpose, he covertly 
supported the Roman-Catholic tribe of Mirdites which occupied a strategically 
important curve along the Drin in their rebellion against the Muslim-dominat-
ed Tirana government and the proclamation of their independent Republic.82 
This was a clear violation of the official policy of supporting an independent 
Albania in the 1913 borders. The Yugoslav military action in support of the Mi-
ridites uprising brought about the intervention of Great Powers as well as res-
ignation of four Cabinet members.83 The dissatisfaction caused within Cabinet 
indicated that Pašić’s handling of Albanian affairs met with strong opposition in 
governmental circles. The assistance given to the Miridites was insufficient and 
their rebellion was quelled by the forces loyal to Tirana. Following strong in-
ternational pressure from Geneva, Belgrade withdrew all its armed forces from 
Albania by the end of 1921. Pašić’s policy failed which was acknowledged by the 
80 AJ, The Foreign Ministry of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, 334-4-18, Jovanović to Ninčić, 2 
June 1921, confidential no. 533; Circular dispatch from the Foreign Ministry to Legations 
abroad, 28 June 1921, confidential no. 5814. An exhaustive account of the Conference of Am-
bassadors’ deliberations is given in ASANU, Subotić Papers, 14576-V-4, The history of our 
policy in Albania in 1921, Dossier Ar. 1 – The borders of Albania, folios 90–118.   
81 AJ, Milan Stojadinović Papers, 37-28-208, Memorandum by Ivan Vukotić, 3 February 
1939. 
82 AJ, The Foreign Ministry of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, 334-4-18, Todorović to Ninčić, 4 
May 1921, confidential no. 601; Todorović to Pašić, 15 August 1921, confidential no. 1437. 
For a detailed account of the Yugoslav dealings with the Miridites tribe see ASANU, Subotić 
Papers, 14576-V-4, The history of our policy in Albania in 1921, Dossier Ar. 4 – Miriditska 
Republika, folios 126–144 and Bogumil Hrabak, “Mirditi izmedju Italijana, arbanaških na-
cionalista i Srba (1918–1921),” Istorija 20. veka 1-2 (1993), 35–51. 
83 Military Archives [Vojni arhiv – VA], registry 17, box 61, fascicle 14, doc. 1, unsigned 
memoirs, typed in Belgrade on 11 May 1952, folio 16. 
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resignation of his deputy in the Foreign Ministry, Tihomir Popović, who was in 
charge of Albanian matters. 
Bulgaria was in the focus of Pašić’s Balkan policy as that country sought 
to redress the consequences of her defeat in the Great War. In particular, the ter-
rorist Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization (IMRO) made incur-
sions into the Serb Macedonia from its strongholds on the Bulgarian territory 
with a view to detaching that province from the SCS Kingdom. The government 
of Alexander Stamboliyski’s Agrarians in Sofia was unable to rein in the “Mace-
donians.” Stamboliyski condemned the pre-war policy of King Ferdinand and 
professed his desire for a close friendship, and even a union, with the Slav breth-
ren in the SCS Kingdom.84 Pašić had doubts about Stamboliyski soundness; 
moreover, he suspected Bulgarian hints at the common interest of Sofia and Bel-
grade to secure on outlet to the Aegean Sea of being mere tactics to compromise 
the SCS Kingdom’s international position.85 His government kept a watchful 
eye on Bulgaria’s execution of the Peace Treaty of Neuilly, especially the clauses 
on disarmament and limitation of armed forces, and lodged protests, together 
with Romania and Greece, to the Conference of Ambassadors on account of So-
fia’s breaches. Nevertheless, Stamboliyski’s persistence and attempts to suppress 
IMRO won him some recognition in Belgrade, which resulted in the conclusion 
of the Niš agreement of 22 March 1923 on the measures to secure the mutual 
border. This seemed to be a major success for Belgrade but a short-lived one. 
The 9 June coup in Bulgaria carried out by fiercely nationalist right-wingers, 
including army officers and IMRO, claimed the life of Stamboliyski and estab-
lished the Alexander Tsankov government deeply distasteful to Belgrade.86 The 
relations between the SCS Kingdom and Bulgaria markedly deteriorated again. 
To pursue his Balkan policy, Pašić wanted good relations with Greece. 
This was a continuation of his pre-1914 policy, of which the Serbo-Greek al-
liance treaty of 1913 concluded with Eleftherios Venizelos was a corner stone. 
During the Peace Conference, he resumed his cooperation with Venizelos, but 
Greek doubts that the Serbs might have designs on their port of Salonica (Thes-
saloniki) – in which Serbia had been granted a free zone for her commerce as 
part of the 1913 agreement – raised difficulties in establishing a true entente 
84 Ivan Ristić, “Politika sporazumevanja u vreme nerazumevanja (rad Aleksandra Stambolij-
skog na jugoslovensko-bugarskom zbliženju 1919–1923)”, Teme: časopis za društvenu teoriju i 
praksu 36/3 (2012), 1033–1046. 
85 Todorović, Jugoslavija i balkanske države, 100–102. For Pašić’s attitude towards the Bulgar-
ians, see Ivan Ristić, “Nikola Pašić i Bugari: geneza ideoloških i političkih stavova”, Zbornik 
Matice srpske za istoriju, 84 (2012), 87–109. 
86 Todorović, Jugoslavija i balkanske države, 200–206, 218–227; Živko Avramovski, “O stavu 
jugoslovenske vlade prema devetojunskom prevratu u Bugarskoj 1923. godine”, Istorija XX 
veka: zbornik radova IX (1968), 133–155. 
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between the two neighbours.87 As Slobodan Jovanović, his contemporary and 
famous historian, perceptively noted, Pašić believed that the security and sta-
bility of the Balkans required a firm Serbo-Greek axis as opposed to a Bulga-
ro-Albanian one; for that reason, he wanted as wide a Serbian-Greek frontier 
as possible.88 Such policy informed the attitude towards Athens following the 
Greek disaster in Asia Minor in the war against the Turkish nationalists. Pašić 
and Momčilo Ninčić, Foreign Minister after January 1922, gave their guarantees 
to the Greek Foreign Minister, Nikolaos Politis, during his visit to Belgrade in 
November 1922 that they would keep in check Bulgaria and prevent her from 
exploiting Greek difficulties with the Turks.89 Indeed, the SCS Kingdom sup-
ported the Greek claims in Thrace prior to and during the Lausanne Conference 
of 1923, disfavouring the establishment of a common Turko-Bulgarian border 
in that province. But Greek statesmen never dispelled their suspicions that the 
Serbs might join forces with the Bulgarians, their Slav brethren, for the purpose 
of ousting Greece from her Aegean littoral.
To discuss Yugoslav policy in the latter half of Pašić’s premiership, it is 
crucial to appreciate that it was not entirely his handiwork. Regent and later 
King (after 1921) Alexander had been an important factor in the formulation 
and execution of foreign policy since 1914, partly because of the exigencies of 
war-time strategy and diplomacy and partly because of his personal ambitions. 
The British Minister in Belgrade, Sir Charles Young, described him in 1925 as 
“the guardian of the main lines of the foreign policy.”90 The King’s influence, how-
ever, increased with Ninčić’s assuming the foreign ministry portfolio. Although 
a prominent Radical of long-standing, the latter immediately came into conflict 
with Pašić and, according to the well-informed Czech sources, saw the economic 
Genoa Conference of 1922 as an opportunity for personal promotion.91 Ninčić 
became King Alexander’s man, acting, as his ministerial colleague would later 
recall, as something of a King’s “secretary for foreign affairs”; he “personally in-
formed the King of his every step in the Foreign Ministry, introduced the prac-
tice of sending the copies of all political telegrams coming from abroad to King, 
and, besides, he would go straight to the Court after every Cabinet meeting to 
87 ASANU, Pašić Papers, no. 14528/II-10, Venizelos to Pašić, 21 January 1919 [in French] 
and Pašić to Venizelos [in French with Serbian draft], 5 February 1919. For a discussion 
of the Salonica issue see, Dragan Bakić, “The Port of Salonica in Yugoslav Foreign Policy, 
1919–1941”, Balcanica XLIII (2012), 191–210. 
88 Lederer, Yugoslavia at the Paris Peace Conference, 91–92.
89 Todorović, Jugoslavija i balkanske države, 173–183.
90 Forthcoming Dragan Bakić, Britain and Interwar Danubian Europe: Foreign Policy and Secu-
rity Challenges, 1919–1936 (London: Bloomsbury, 2017), 38.
91 Todorović, Jugoslavija i balkanske države, 160. 
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make a report.”92 In addition, King Alexander was in direct contact with some 
of the diplomatic envoys, his personal friends, especially those who occupied the 
most important Legations. Cases in point were Miroslav Spalajković, Minister 
in Paris (1922–1935), and Živojin Balugdžić, whose posts abroad included Ath-
ens, Rome and Berlin, although the former was also a friend of Pašić.93 King Al-
exander’s impact on foreign policy, as will be seen, would be most tangible in the 
matter of SCS-Italian relations, the most troublesome aspect of international 
affairs for Belgrade. 
Under Mussolini’s direction, with his visceral anti-Slav prejudice and 
grand imperialist designs, Italian attitude towards the SCS Kingdom increased 
the anxieties among the Yugoslavs. After the 9 June coup in Bulgaria, the posi-
tion in the Balkans opened new possibilities for Italian intrigue. To preclude 
trouble from that quarter, King Alexander was anxious to come to terms with 
Rome and make the necessary sacrifices for that purpose. Since the Fiume settle-
ment had proved unworkable and the town had been effectively occupied by 
Italian army, it was clear that it would have to be abandoned in any agreement. 
In a conversation with an Italian delegate at Geneva in September 1923, Ninčić 
pointed out that the King was his only true supporter in a consistent policy of 
rapprochement with Rome.94 And indeed, Pašić was in no hurry to make an 
agreement with Italy as he thought that he could extract greater concessions: 
he wanted to have Zara and the island of Lastovo in exchange for Fiume. He 
was also concerned that Paris and London might take a dim view of an Italo-
Yugoslav settlement, but King Alexander was in no mood to procrastinate and 
did not consider Fiume too high a price.95 It was the King’s conception that 
prevailed and the Pašić government agreed to Italian annexation of Fiume, while 
the port of Baroš and Delta were separated from the Fiume municipality and 
given to the SCS Kingdom. This final territorial arrangement was accompanied 
by a treaty of friendship that was intended to mark the improvement of Italo-
SCS relations. Disputes emerged between Pašić and Ninčić during the drafting 
of that treaty, and King Alexander then entrusted Spalajković with completing 
92 Milan Stojadinović, Ni rat ni pakt: Jugoslavija izmedju dva rata (Buenos Aires, 1963), 206; 
also Slobodan Jovanović, Moji savremenici, 68. 
93 Zoran Bajin, “Miroslav Spalajković (1869–1951): biografija” (PhD thesis, University of 
Belgrade, 2016), 355–384. There is no scholarly work on Balugdžić, but his portrait, based on 
the memoirs of his subordinate in Berlin, is given in Miloš Crnjanski, Embahade (Belgrade: 
Službeni glasnik, 2009), ch. 1.  
94 Bogdan Krizman, “Italija u politici kralja Aleksandra i kneza Pavla (1918–1941)”, Časopis 
za suvremenu povijest 7/1 (1975), 36. 
95 Branislav Gligorijević, Kralj Aleksandar Karadjordjević: u evropskoj politici (Belgrade: Za-
vod za udžbenike, 2010), 35, 37; Enes Milak, “Kraljevina Srba, Hrvata i Slovenaca i Rimski 
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this task.96 Pašić’s reserves, however, should not be overstated, as they presum-
ably concerned minor issues rather than the fundamentals of the impending 
treaty. That is clear from the fact that Pašić traveled to Rome himself and signed 
the friendship agreement with Mussolini (the Pact of Rome) on 27 January 
1924.97 This treaty was a gain for Belgrade in that it left a free hand to the SCS 
Kingdom to deal with troubles in the Balkans, namely the expected IMRO’s 
incursions into Macedonia – the Albanian question lay dormant.  
The Pact of Rome was intended to usher in a new era in the relations 
between the two Adriatic neighbours, but that was not to be the case. To begin 
with, Italy and the SCS Kingdom were at cross purposes. For Mussolini, the 
treaty was designed to sever the ties between Paris and Belgrade, and break up 
the Little Entente, a pillar of the French security system in the Danube region.98 
Thus he had played at first with the idea of a Franco-Italo-SCS agreement to 
neutralise French influence in Belgrade, only to drop it once he had realised 
he could make a bilateral deal with the SCS Kingdom. But he did not deceive 
Pašić. According to Jules Laroche, the latter saw through Mussolini’s game and 
understood that an agreement with Italy could not be reached on a tripartite ba-
sis.99 Pašić was also correct in anticipating French, though not British, discomfi-
ture with a treaty of the alleged French protégé concluded with Italy seemingly 
without much regard for the susceptibilities felt in Paris. The Italian treaty also 
raised doubts in the Quai d’Orsay about the real Yugoslav motives and inten-
tions. King Alexander himself had to assure the French in April 1924 that the 
Pact of Rome was not aimed against Greece and that its sole object, as far as 
he was concerned, was to keep the Italians at arm’s length from the Balkans.100 
The French also suspected the Serbs of planning to invade Bulgaria under the 
excuse of eliminating the IMRO strongholds but, in reality, for the purpose of 
acquiring the Pernik coal mines. In their perspective, the conclusion of a friend-
96 Bajin, “Miroslav Spalajković (1869–1951): biografija”, 407.  
97 Milak, “Kraljevina Srba, Hrvata i Slovenaca i Rimski sporazum”; Alan Cassels, Mussolini’s 
Early Diplomacy (Princeton University Press, 1970), 135–165. 
98 William Shorrock, From Ally to Enemy: the Enigma of Fascist Italy in French Diplomacy 
(Kent, Ohio: The Kent State University Press, 1988), 44–46; John Gooch, Mussolini and 
his Generals: the Armed Forces and Fascist Foreign Policy, 1922–1940 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2007), 9. 
99 Vuk Vinaver, Jugoslavija i Mađarska, 253.
100 Vuk Vinaver, Jugoslavija i Francuska izmedju dva svetska rata: da li je Jugoslavija bila fran-
cuski “satelit” (Belgrade: Institut za savremenu istoriju, 1985), 65; Antonina Kuzmanova, “Sur 
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ship agreement with Belgrade would have the advantage of forcing it to be more 
amenable to advice of moderation from Paris.101
Still, the Yugoslavs were careful to cultivate Mussolini’s goodwill and thus 
evaded to proceed with coming to an agreement with France despite the wishes 
of Paris. Pašić avoided visiting the French capital on his way back home from 
Rome, although Spalajković relayed to him President Millerand’s and Prime 
Minister Poincaré’s invitation.102 Belgrade continued to manoeuvre for the next 
two years, fearing Rome’s ambitions in the Balkans and trying to stall them with 
a formal friendship and seeking for protection in Paris though without a formal 
agreement. Although the French suspicions of Yugoslav imperialist designs were 
much exaggerated, Belgrade was more assertive in its relations with the Balkan 
countries in the aftermath of the Pact of Rome. In November 1924, the Pašić 
government denounced the 1913 alliance pact with Greece due to the dissatis-
faction over the Graeco-Bulgarian minority convention concluded two months 
earlier and the ineffectiveness of the arrangement concerning the Salonica free 
101 Vinaver, Jugoslavija i Francuska izmedju dva svetska rata, 67–68, 75; Stanislav Sretenović, 
Francuska i Kraljevina Srba, Hrvata i Slovenaca 1918–1929 (Belgrade: Institut za savremenu 
istoriju, 2008), 307–309, 318. 
102 Vinaver, Jugoslavija i Francuska izmedju dva svetska rata, 67. 
Nikola Pašić and Benito Mussolini  
sign the treaty of friendship (the Pact of Rome) on 27 January 1924  
[National Library of Serbia, Af 42, from the album “The Little Entente Conference  
in Prague, July 1924”]
Balcanica XLVII (2016)312
zone. After prolonged negotiations, Athens surrendered to Belgrade’s demands 
in August 1926 but the revolution that deposed General Pangalos prevented the 
ratification of the agreement – the dispute would be settled in 1929.103 A study 
of Yugo-Greek relations has stated that it was Ninčić who drove policy in this 
case in the teeth of Pašić’s opposition, but it offers no evidence.104
The SCS Kingdom certainly pursued a determined policy in Albania, 
but this did not result from the accord with Rome. Quite the contrary, it was 
an expression of the unabated rivalry with Italy that would undermine the Pact 
of Rome and lead to a definite rupture between the two countries. When the 
pro-Italian bishop Fan-Noli overthrew Ahmed-Zogu in 1924, Pašić made an 
agreement with the latter, not confirmed in a written document, to support him 
to return to power in Tirana in exchange for Zogu’s promise to settle the out-
standing questions with the SCS Kingdom in Belgrade’s favour. Although Zogu 
re-established himself in power, he turned into Italian protégé in the long run, 
as Rome provided financial means for the functioning of Albanian administra-
tion, which Belgrade could not afford.105 The conversations that Ninčić held in 
Rome in February 1926 failed to find either a solution to the mounting Italo-
SCS conflict in Albania or to settle the relations in the Franco-Italian-SCS tri-
angle and stabilize the Balkans. Soon afterwards, in April, Pašić was forced to 
resign as Prime Minister on account of the corruption scandal in which his son 
was accused of being involved. Therefore, the handling of Italy was left entirely 
in the hands of Ninčić. It ended with the announcement of the Italo-Albanian 
treaty on 27 November 1926 (the Pact of Tirana), which stipulated that Italy 
would guarantee the “political, judicial and territorial status quo” in Albania. 
This was effectively the establishment of an Italian protectorate over Albania 
– and a heavy blow for the SCS Kingdom’s foreign policy. It also set the stage 
for the conclusion of the Franco-SCS friendship treaty in November 1927 and 
a decade of hostile relations between Belgrade and Rome. But the foreign policy 
of the SCS Kingdom would then be in the hands of other governments. Ninčić, 
who banked his whole policy on the agreement and friendly relations with Italy, 
acting on instructions from the King, resigned from his position on 6 December 
1926. Pašić passed away four days later.  
Shortly after his death, Spalajković criticised Pašić that he had made a 
serious mistake concluding the Pact of Rome without making a simultaneous 
103 Bakić, “The Port of Salonica in Yugoslav Foreign Policy”, 198–203.   
104 Aleksandra Pećinar, “Diplomatski odnosi Kraljevine Jugoslavije i Grčke u periodu posled-
nje vlade Elefteriosa Venizelosa (1928–1932)” (PhD thesis, University of Belgrade, 2012), 
48–49. 
105 Bakić, “The Italo-Yugoslav Conflict over Albania”, 597–601; Živko Avramovski, “Italija-
nska ekonomska penetracija u Albaniju 1925. do 1935. godine”, Istorija 20. veka 5 (1963), 
137–224. 
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agreement with France, because that created an illusion that the SCS King-
dom’s Balkan policy would eventually have to be subordinated to that of Italy. 
“The late Pašić did not see clearly, and with old age his well-known caution was 
further increased.”106 This was certainly not a fair critique of Pašić’s policy and 
Spalajković should have known better. First, there was no possibility of conclud-
ing a treaty both with France and Italy, because Mussolini would not have it. 
The Pact of Rome was not a lasting achievement but it at least provided a short 
respite from rampant Italian intrigue in the Balkans. Second, Pašić alone had ad-
vocated a settlement with Rome in January 1920 and that under more favourable 
conditions than those obtained later in the ill-fated Rapallo treaty. In the run-up 
to the Pact of Rome, he wanted to make a harder bargain with Mussolini, and 
he was perfectly aware of the repercussions that an Italian treaty would have in 
Paris – after all, it was King Alexander who precipitated the 1924 agreement. 
The outcome was not Pašić’s favourite solution but he accepted it nevertheless 
as there was no feasible alternative. Pašić’s diplomatic skill was considerable but 
not even he could perform miracles. In the aftermath of the Pact of Rome, Pašić 
seems to have been somewhat less personally involved in the conduct of foreign 
policy, partly because King Alexander and his loyal Ninčić took a leading part 
in this field and partly because he was absorbed in internal politics, which was 
exceedingly turbulent in the nascent and unsettled SCS Kingdom.      
UDC 929 Nikola Pašić:327(497.1:450)”1919/1926”
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